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Abstract—Well-meaning cybersecurity risk owners will deploy
countermeasures (technologies or procedures) to manage risks
to their services or systems. In some cases, those countermea-
sures will produce unintended consequences, which must then
be addressed. Unintended consequences can potentially induce
harm, adversely affecting user behaviour, user inclusion, or the
infrastructure itself (including other services or countermea-
sures). Here we propose a framework for preemptively identifying
unintended harms of risk countermeasures in cybersecurity.
The framework identifies a series of unintended harms which
go beyond technology alone, to consider the cyberphysical and
sociotechnical space: displacement, insecure norms, additional
costs, misuse, misclassification, amplification, and disruption. We
demonstrate our framework through application to the complex,
multi-stakeholder challenges associated with the prevention of
cyberbullying as an applied example. Our framework aims
to illuminate harmful consequences, not to paralyze decision-
making, but so that potential unintended harms can be more
thoroughly considered in risk management strategies. The frame-
work can support identification and preemptive planning to
identify vulnerable populations and preemptively insulate them
from harm. There are opportunities to use the framework in
coordinating risk management strategy across stakeholders in
complex cyberphysical environments.
Index Terms—risk analysis, cybercrime, unintended conse-
quences, unintended harms, countermeasures
I. INTRODUCTION
To manage risks to a system of computing devices or an
online platform/service, system owners may deploy additional
controls —countermeasures— to generally increase security,
or to address specific risks. These can range from keeping
system software up-to-date (e.g., to thwart commodity attacks),
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to targeted countermeasures to address risks specific to an
individual system or situation of concern.
Countermeasures can include technical controls, such as
advanced verification of user accounts. Countermeasures can
also include policies and guidance for the users of a system,
such as awareness materials or a declaration of expected con-
ditions of use (as for a forum or an organisation’s computers).
These countermeasures may be deployed to manage particular
risks (e.g., identifying specific language or topics as not being
allowed on a social platform), or to raise the minimum level
of security within a system to make it safer (e.g., added
authentication requirements for accessing a platform).
The deployment of countermeasures is driven by good
intentions, to prevent or reduce the harms of particular
risks. However, countermeasures themselves may introduce
unintended consequences, be it in crime prevention [1]–[3],
physical safety [4], or in IT-security more generally [5]. Often
even less considered: in fact countermeasures can actually do
harm, e.g. to infrastructure or to some or all of its users. This
harm may be as slight as causing disruption and additional
security burden for legitimate users of a system [6], or as
severe as causing negative impact on whole groups of users,
such that they are forced away from the system/service or find
themselves in a position of increased physical or psychological
harm. This paper explores the space of unintended harms.
The need to study unintended harms in detail is demon-
strated in recent real-world events. One example is the de-
ployment of facial recognition in publicly-accessible spaces
to augment law enforcement and public control capabilities.
The intention may have been to reduce crime and unwanted
behaviours, but it has also sparked privacy concerns, for
instance in the United States [7] and United Kingdom [8]. The
debate centres on whether such systems are appropriate, given
the potential for invasion of privacy and linking of data to other
systems (with, in some cases, limits to system accuracy [9],
which could have potentially harmful consequences). This
example shows where a risk countermeasure with protective
aims can have potentially negative impacts upon people.
A. Our contribution
Our contributions are arranged in three steps: case studies,
a framework based on outcomes of the case studies, and
application of the framework to a new case study. We begin
by presenting five case studies (Section III) to help highlight
readily observed unintended harms. We select a range of
complex examples, namely: intimate partner abuse, disinfor-
mation campaigns, CEO fraud, phishing, and dating fraud.
For each case study, we consider the unintended consequences
associated with the potential interventions that may be applied.
Within the case studies we also convey how stakeholders
acting alone can undo not only their own efforts but also those
of others; this points to a need for a shared terminology and
strategic thinking between stakeholders. We broadly categorise
potential interventions according to whether they are directed
towards changing content (as outcomes of user behaviour),
users, or infrastructure.
Based on the case studies, we construct a framework for
conceptualising potential unintended consequences and harms
(Section IV). We classify these as: imposing additional cost;
misuse; insecure norms/complacency; false positives; displace-
ment; amplification; or disruption of other countermeasures.
To evaluate our findings, we note that there are often specific
populations that are more vulnerable to unintended harms than
others (Section V), before applying our framework to the
challenge of preventing cyberbullying (Section VI).
The framework has been developed to better understand the
potential for unintended harms. This is important for consider-
ing how the harms might be mitigated at the point of designing
or deploying countermeasures (Section VII). Another intended
purpose is for informing the design of evaluation studies,
to ensure that unintended harms are monitored alongside
the intended outcomes. Considering other approaches which
may illicit unintended harms (Section VIII), we discuss the
implications and potential future applications of the framework
(Section VII), and conclude with next steps (Section IX).
II. BACKGROUND
Here we outline how content (produced by user behaviour),
users, and infrastructure may be impacted by countermeasures,
and the unintended consequences of particular countermea-
sures (including unintended harms). Risk may be managed
in a centralised manner (such as security in an organisa-
tion/business, often managed by a security manager or security
function). In more complex situations, risk management efforts
must involve a range of stakeholders (including end-users)
across a wider environment.
A. Countermeasures
We consider a treatment specifically deployed to handle a
risk countermeasure. Referring to the ISO 27001 risk treatment
framework [10], action may be taken to manage a risk, or
accept it as a residual risk. It should be noted that a risk/system
owner may deploy a countermeasure against a perceived risk
[11]; action may be taken against a risk which a stakeholder
Fig. 1. The Johari Window, as a means to consider the limitations to
knowledge of risks (and in turn, countermeasures) between one entity and



















believes to be present, or which they anticipate, rather than an
existing risk for which there is exhaustive evidence.
Figure 1 [12] depicts the different qualities of ignorance a
stakeholder may suffer from as the Johari Window [13]. This is
where unintended consequences can emerge: if action is taken
based on incomplete knowledge, it may increase consequences
for a particular group which was not the intended target, to
the extent that it creates harms. A risk/system owner may be
best-served by gathering information or opinions from other
stakeholders in the environment before taking action. This
can increase the open/free knowledge available to many, as
in Figure 1.
B. Unintended consequences
Unintended consequences can refer to observed phenonema
such as ‘knock-on effects’, ‘side-effects’, or ‘maladaptive
responses’ (e.g., to security awareness campaigns [14]). A
countermeasure may also trigger a ‘cascade effect’ [15], in
what appears to be a sequence of subsequent actions. It is
then necessary to have a means to map this complexity.
Relevant principles considered in the economics of security
can help to articulate the characteristics of unintended harms
of cybersecurity countermeasures. These include risk dumping,
externalities, information asymmetry, and moral hazards.
We regard risk dumping [16] as the shifting of risks to
entities in the environment who are both unprepared to manage
the risk and with whom a negotiation to manage the risk
did not happen. We see this commonly in everyday security,
for instance, in the existence of workarounds and coping
strategies in IT-enabled workplaces [6], as an indirect result
of inappropriate risk controls [17].
Externalities refer to the actions of one party creating a
positive or negative impact upon another [18]. We consider
harms as negative side-effects upon another party, including
those who were not the intended target. Risk management
activities are often seen as wholly positive; however, as we
demonstrate in our case studies (Section III), some risk man-
agement actions can adversely affect other actors in the system
and even the risk/system owners themselves. Considering
negative externalities is critical, as they may create additional
costs which must be borne by others and not the original risk
owner. The original risk owner may in fact be unaware of the
burden they have placed on others. This can especially be the
case if specific behaviours, users, or technologies are removed
as a consequence of a countermeasure, and no longer register
within ongoing risk measurement capabilities (referring to
Figure 1, the risk owner becomes ‘blind’).
Another principle considered in security economics is infor-
mation asymmetry [18]. That is where information or actions
are known by one entity but not others. Those impacted
by risk management actions may not have the information,
which risk owners might assume they would have, to manage
risks appropriately. Such ‘hidden’ actions can also include
proactive, well-meaning activities by multiple stakeholders
(e.g. [19], [20]). For instance, evidence-gathering by law
enforcement may be disrupted if the observed asset is impacted
by a well-meaning system owner who acts upon the asset (such
as disrupting a website, as in Figure 1).
This points also to moral hazard [21], where a system owner
may not take action to, for instance, recover users or user
behaviours to their platform which have been forced out, if
it does not create any harm for them. This can be the case if
affected users are disempowered and are unable to register that
they have been adversely affected. This is another key aspect
of managing unintended harms strategically —a stakeholder
may not be incentivised to undo or avoid unintended harms,
unless the avoidance of harms becomes part of the strategic
planning of the platform itself. One example may be if controls
prevent some users from using an online social platform, even
where the impact on a subset of those users is in effect
‘collateral damage’— the controls have achieved their intended
aim, but also impacted others who it was not intended to affect.
C. Unintended harms
We regard unintended harms as unintended consequences
which have been shifted to another entity in the environment
without them being adequately prepared, or able at all to
respond to the additional risk they are burdened with as a
result. Similarly, an entity with a stable and safe experience
within the managed environment may find themselves moved
to another set of circumstances where they no longer enjoy
the benefits of the stable environment. Critically, we see two
shifts in the management of risks: (1) the current globalised
climate of cyber aggression and cyber deception (including
potentially commoditised cyber fraud [22]); combining with
(2) the increased positioning and proliferation of technologies
(and ‘cybersecurity’ capabilities) in peoples’ lives [23]. With
these two trends, there is increased possibility of personal
harms —physical, cognitive, or psychological— to individuals.
Where prior examination of risk management has alluded to
potential side-effects of cybersecurity countermeasures, we
believe this is the first work to consider development of a
dedicated framework for (i) exploring potential unintended
harms, and (ii) prioritising their identification to protect users
from being adversely (perhaps irrecoverably) affected.
III. CASE STUDIES
We describe five case studies within the space of cyber
aggression or cyber deception. For each case study, we provide
example countermeasures and potential unintended harms. The
set of countermeasures and associated risks in each scenario
is not exhaustive.
A. Intimate partner abuse
Bob and Charlie live together. Charlie is controlling
and monitors Bob’s behaviour using IoT devices [20]. This
includes Bob’s smartphone [24]. When suspecting Bob might
be visiting friends, Charlie goes on to Twitter and shares
aggressive and fabricated posts about Bob [24], [25].
Discard suspect devices. Advice to Bob may be to discard
their devices (including smartphones) so that they cannot be
tracked [26], [27]. Having no access to technology (and poten-
tially with this, online service accounts accessed through those
devices) may hamper any efforts by Bob to access housing and
financial support [28]. If tech-enabled communication were not
disrupted, it could be a way to monitor and manage Charlie’s
actions [27], and avoid escalating potential harms. Discarding
devices may also destroy evidence that could otherwise be used
in legal processes/proceedings [27].
Remove harmful content. If Charlie has created offensive
online content (or shared intimate content widely online), legal
channels may be developed to allow Bob to have the content
‘taken down’, but this might create an additional barrier of
Bob needing to find and/or hire a legal professional, to work
on behalf of Bob [27].
Provide guidance. It may seem useful for experts to produce
advice for securing personal devices, so that people in a similar
situation to Bob can control access to shared devices and
accounts. This however may require information to be targeted,
and available when it is needed [28], as Bob may have limited
time alone to act in a climate of abuse (more so if those devices
are shared [29]). With technology having been used to create
harm, Bob may instead fear technology and not wish to use
any technology-based solutions [27], so using technology to
fix a technology-based problem may not be an appropriate way
to provide support.
B. Disinformation campaigns
There is a political campaign where Bob and Charlie
are both running for governor. A third party, who supports
Charlie, conducts a concerted misinformation campaign
to spread false information about Bob. This is done
predominantly via Facebook and Twitter, and initiated via a
network of social media bots which disseminate the material.
The main goal of the campaign is to deceive voters [30]–[32].
Content removal. This countermeasure generally involves
the removal of content, accounts and/or bots [30], [31]. The
removal of content may create a ‘Streisand effect’, where
the request to remove content can draw increased attention
to it [30], [33]. In the scenario, removal of content may
backfire if the third-party presents this as unjust [33], using
it as proof of a conspiracy and suppression of ‘truth’ against
them. Such removal can potentially speed up misinformation
diffusion [34], [35]. Removing only some misinformation
while leaving similar material available potentially confers
validity to that remaining content [36], making it more difficult
for citizens to determine which content can be trusted.
Account removal. The removal of accounts or content does
not address the root cause or motivation for a misinformation
campaign. Instead, it displaces a subset of users to other
available and more accommodating platforms. For example,
in the United States, there is a shift to using platforms such as
Gab and Telegram channels for alt-right movement supporters,
as a response to bans and removals on mainstream platforms
such as Facebook and Twitter [37]. This may in turn result
in an ‘echo chamber’, where individuals are surrounded with
information that confirms their own beliefs, opinions, and
views, and ultimately results in group polarisation [32], [38].
Removal of bots. Although potentially effective [39], this can
result in misclassification. Misclassification is of increasing
concern as social bots’ capabilities to generate human-like
behaviours are improving [40], [41]. There are two general
types of misclassification: false negatives and false positives.
False negatives, or the misclassification of bots as legitimate
accounts, can intensify the effects of disinformation, as users
may trust information from bots [42], and bots have been
found to be more likely to share false information [39]. False
positives, or misclassification of non-bot accounts as bots, can
lead to a perception of censorship among legitimate users [39].
It can also potentially displace users to other platforms (then
transferring risks, rather than reducing them).
Automated detection algorithms. The development of auto-
detection algorithms [31], [39], [40] raises similar potential
harms as removal. The goal is to reduce the burden on users
in detecting and verifying accuracy and falseness of content
and/or accounts [30], [39]. This can, perversely, potentially
reduce users’ scepticism towards misinformation [42]. Another
unintended consequence of automated detection is automation-
related complacency potential and automation bias. Compla-
cency refers to poorer detection of malfunctions, while the
latter refers to errors made by individuals based on their
interactions with imperfect automated decision aids [41].
Fact-checking. Fact-checking [32] may be introduced. This
may either incorporate fact-checking as part of content man-
agement [31], or encourage users to utilise tools prior to
sharing information [42]. With both approaches, an unintended
consequence is fostering a sense of complacency among
users. In the context of Twitter, the effect of fact-checking
in changing discourse is mediated by social relationships
between users [43], and by content of the fact-check [44]. In
addition, the effectiveness of fact-check posts are dependent
on the content’s level of controversy [44]. Overall, users may
potentially utilise services such as Snopes for the purpose
of status management, while elites of a community use fact-
checking to challenge users of other communities [43]. In this
context, fact-checking is used to solidify in-group status and
can contribute to group polarisation and fragmentation.
C. CEO fraud
Bob discovers the name and contact details of a major
company’s CEO. Knowing that the company has a very
hierarchical structure, Bob identifies a relevant employee
within the finance team: Charlie. Bob sends an email to
Charlie, pretending to be the CEO. As emails within the
organisation are not cryptographically signed, Bob does an
effective job at masquerading as the CEO. The email states
that Charlie should immediately pay an invoice, bypassing
the usual checks and balances. Due to fear of retribution,
Charlie pays the invoice believing the email to be authentic.
The money, however, is transferred to Bob’s bank account
and Charlie is disciplined for their actions.
Behaviour and security culture change. Changes may be
made to working practices, to remove the likelihood of em-
ployees finding themselves under pressure to fulfil last-minute
requests that do not follow correct protocols. This can lead
to complacency, if restrictions through technical solutions are
not matched with changes to workplace behaviours (foremost,
senior staff making last-minute requests from non-corporate
email accounts). There are a range of challenges in measuring
security culture [45], where different groups of employees
may be susceptible to attacks (such as CEO Fraud) more than
others, without the company becoming aware of it.
Electronic signatures. Electronic signatures or alternative
forms of blocking spoofed emails (e.g., domain blocking of
insecure SMTP servers) may be employed. This involves
ensuring that spoofed emails cannot reach employees. This
again can result in complacency, as these techniques are rarely
100% effective. In many cases, people will accept unverified
emails even in the case of failed signatures. An alternative
is to simply change policies to prevent email systems from
being used to request transfers. Although an effective means,
this can negatively impact productivity within the company.
Furthermore, it is difficult to technically enforce this — con-
sequently, certain employees may breach any such protocol.
Payment authorisation. Another approach is to restructure
the organisation, such that employees cannot request or exe-
cute transfers without checks. For instance, additional authen-
tication may be requested for all transfers. The person per-
forming authorisation could also be trained in fraud detection.
This may be able to reduce the probability of attack, although
it could also create additional costs on the employees due to
the additional time required for completing each transaction.
Email monitoring. This may be employed to automatically
identify cases of fraud. This brings a number of risks, par-
ticularly as false positives may desensitise users to warnings.
This may also trigger privacy concerns amongst employees,
leading them to disengage from the security mechanisms.
D. Phishing
Bob was recently fired, and subsequently holds bitter
resentment towards their former employer. Bob devises
a phishing attack against the purchasing department of
the company. Bob spoofs the email address of one of the
company’s supplier contacts and sends an email to the
department’s employees pointing to a web page Bob has
set up on a separate website, which prompts visitors for
username and password to purportedly get advanced access
to new prices for materials and supplies for the next fiscal
year. Charlie enters their credentials, which Bob then uses to
gain access to the company’s materials and supply database.
Bob deletes the database causing thousands of pounds in loss
to the company.
Automatic detection and filtering. This uses a combination of
methods, such as blacklists and machine learning models that
use the structural features of email messages (e.g., headers,
content, embedded URLs) to facilitate detection of phishing
messages [46], [47]. Internet Service Providers (ISPs) or email
providers block the detected messages from being delivered.
System users may become complacent about the emails that
they have sight of, assuming that automated solutions block
anything that is potentially harmful to them (although auto-
mated solutions do not necessarily block all malicious emails).
Website takedown. Websites used for phishing may also be
taken down [48]. Unintended harms from these approaches
include insecure norms/complacency due to false negatives;
users might acquire a false sense of security, and detection
masks the reality that phishing messages and web sites are
constantly changing. Conversely, false positives resulting from
message filtering and taking down of websites can cause
users to lose benign, potentially important messages, and for
businesses to be wrongly flagged as malicious senders.
User training and education. Attempts may be made to
educate users so that they can identify phishing messages [49]–
[51]. There are a variety of proposed training approaches,
ranging from games [52], [53] to simulated phishing cam-
paigns, especially in corporate environments [50]. It can be the
case that those who are unable to identify phishing messages
repeatedly fail to spot them [50], masking that alternative
solutions are needed. Training can also induce additional costs
to users, in attending training sessions and then managing
additional security tasks on top of their primary work tasks
everyday activities. This adds to the users’ ‘compliance bud-
get’ [54], reducing productivity. For certain users, it might also
cause them to become overly sensitive, ignoring legitimate
messages they are unsure how to classify (where this can
increase false positives). Another general unintended harm
of user training is that attackers may adapt to act around
prescribed behaviours, in something of a perpetual ‘arms
race’.
E. Dating fraud
Charlie is searching for a partner on an online dating site.
Charlie encounters Bob, and they hit it off. Unfortunately,
Bob lives in Peru and cannot afford to travel to meet Charlie.
After a few weeks of intimate conversation, Bob requests
$3000 to book a flight and visit Charlie. Once the money has
been transferred, Charlie never hears from Bob again.
Verify user identities. As the fraudster has no doubt misrepre-
sented themselves, an obvious countermeasure might involve
verifying the identity of dating site users through some techni-
cal or administrative means. However, the cost of background
checks could be prohibitive [55], and crucially, legitimate users
may find that the verification process interferes with their
preferred means of self-representation on a dating site, which
itself could involve some small degree of misrepresentation
or selectivity [56]. Where technical implementations rely on
connecting social networking accounts, this can expose users
to risks of misuse by either the dating site (now possessing
their public identity, and perhaps an excess of information) or
the social networking site (which now possesses potentially
sensitive information about their sexuality [57]), and cor-
respondingly increase safeguarding responsibilities for these
organisations [58].
Close fraudulent accounts. Fraudulent accounts may be
closed where these can be identified. Systems for this can
be either post-hoc, with the onus on dating site users to report
a profile they believe to be fraudulent, or preemptive, with
moderators or technical controls screening profiles for markers
of suspicious behaviour [55], [59]. Reporting systems can
be abused by users in redress of personal grievances [60],
and so reports must be reviewed by human moderators,
a monotonous job which may create additional risks and
harms [61]. Screening mechanisms can also misfire, requiring
a means of redress, and might be especially discriminatory
for users from particular backgrounds or locations (e.g., West
Africa) [55], unfairly excluding them from an important venue
for modern romance.
Press criminal charges. Damaged victims may seek to press
criminal charges against a fraudster. The scale of online fraud,
and the number of jurisdictional hurdles to clear, make such
prosecutions difficult for law enforcement, and can in some
cases expose the victim to additional risk of revictimisation
fraud [55].
Provide advice. Quite aside from whether the advice for
avoiding fraud is effective [62], well-intentioned descriptions
of ‘what to look out for’ can provide invaluable advice for
fraudsters on how to disguise their future activities on dating
platforms.
F. Summary
Our case studies have illustrated an – albeit limited –
range of unintended harms emerging from otherwise well-
meaning countermeasures to risks. In exploring unintended
harms across the case studies, we recognise overarching cat-
egories of unintended harms across multiple scenarios (e.g.,
that automated solutions may misclassify legitimate users and
their activity, or that increased security may disrupt how
well-meaning users interact with an online platform). These
categories were developed into a taxonomy that can support
coordinated exploration of the implications of unintended
cybersecurity harms upon behaviours, users, and infrastructure
in the next section.
IV. UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES AND HARMS
Based on our analysis of the harms described above (and
sundry others), we next strive to create a taxonomy of un-
intended harms of cybersecurity countermeasures. From this,
we discuss a simple framework which can be used to identify
unintended consequences of future countermeasures.
A. Taxonomy of Unintended Harms
First, we propose a general taxonomy that captures key
types of unintended consequences and points to their potential
harms. We identify seven broad categories:
1) Displacement: Crime displacement occurs when crime
moves to other locations, times, targets, methods, per-
petrators, or offences, as the result of crime prevention
initiatives [63]. Examples include the surge of new
online drug markets following the takedown of Silk
Road [64], or phishing sites moving to domains and
hosts which are more resistant to takedown efforts [48].
2) Insecure norms: The implementation of countermea-
sures encourages insecure behaviours, creating the po-
tential for greater harm. Examples include creating a
reliance on technical controls [65], and normalising the
sharing of personal data for identification purposes.
3) Additional costs: Countermeasures can often involve
additional costs to particular parties in terms of time
or resources. If a cost-benefit analysis has not been
performed [66], the costs to some stakeholders may
outweigh the original harm. Examples include reporting
systems for social media abuse which pose a burden
of manual review for social media companies and their
employees [61], and cases where there is a reliance on
anti-phishing training which places the burden of respon-
sibility for phish detection on low-level employees.
4) Misuse: A countermeasure developed to prevent harm
may be intentionally misused by a variety of actors
in order to create new harms [67]. Examples include
reporting systems being used maliciously as a result of
personal grievances [60] or competitive business inter-
ests [48], and details provided for identity verification
purposes being sold to advertisers.
5) Misclassification: Technological or administrative sys-
tems that create good/bad or allowed/disallowed distinc-
tions will occasionally classify non-malicious content or
individuals as malicious. The harm that those affected by
misclassification will suffer can be significant if it is not
anticipated. Examples include the “cold start” problem
in reputation systems, with legitimate new users being
unable to establish credibility to enter a community, and
stringent identity verification processes preventing indi-
viduals without documentation from accessing necessary
services.
6) Amplification: Interventions can backfire, causing an
increase in the behaviour targeted for prevention. Ex-
amples include abusers escalating violence when made
aware of attempts at disconnecting them from their vic-
tims [68], and the ‘Streisand effect’, where an attempt to
take down content causes increased interest in preserving
and sharing it [33].
7) Disruption: Countermeasures can interrupt the
operation of other, potentially more effective,
countermeasures. Examples include devices used
in partner abuse being discarded, or abusive online
content being taken down, destroying evidence for
criminal prosecution [24]. Identity verification schemes
can prevent users from protecting themselves from
online abuse with anonymity/pseudonymity, and
security and safety advice provided for a number of
issues can contradict other advice, leading to confusion
and mistakes among users [69], [70].
B. A Framework for Unintended Harms
We further developed the unintended harm categories de-
scribed above into a framework of questions. These questions
may be asked of any (proposed or existing) countermeasure, in
order to identify potential negative and harmful consequences
of deployment upon user behaviours, users, or infrastructure.
The framework questions are presented in Table I.
The ordering of the questions in Table I does not imply any
ordering of importance, though the final question would ideally
be considered after fact-finding efforts to explore questions
1-7. The eighth and final question can be considered as a
cross-cutting concern – harm to a particular group might occur
through any of the previously-described mechanisms. The
explicit consideration of groups allows users of the framework
to consciously identify when a countermeasure is shifting risk
between stakeholders. This is especially important when a
countermeasure might shift harm from less vulnerable groups
to more vulnerable groups (as discussed further in Section V).
The questions are deliberately framed to prompt a response,
and be open enough to prompt consideration of any or all
of behaviours, users, and infrastructure, beyond thinking of
implications for technological solutions alone. We do not
assert that the framework will exhaustively identify all di-
mensions of unintended consequences equally, but that the
questions in the framework sufficiently support exploration
of impacts which relocate or transform user behaviours, users
and their circumstances, and infrastructure (including how they
are perceived). One goal is to provide decision-makers with
the tools to anticipate the (potentially harmful) unintended
consequences of their actions, where currently there are few,
if any, tools which achieve this directly.
The framework is intentionally generative, providing
prompts for the identification of new possible harms from
TABLE I
FRAMEWORK OF PROBE QUESTIONS FOR EXPLORING CATEGORIES OF UNINTENDED HARMS.
Item Harm Category Probe Question
1 Displacement In what ways might the countermeasure displace harm to others?
2 Insecure norms In what ways might this countermeasure create insecure norms (especially complacency)?
3 Additional costs In what ways does the countermeasure burden stakeholders?
4 Misuse In what ways could the countermeasure be used in attacks?
5 Misclassification In what ways does incorrect classification cause harm?
6 Amplification In what ways could the countermeasure amplify harm?
7 Disruption How might the countermeasure disrupt another countermeasure?
8 ALL Which groups are more at risk of experiencing harm from the countermeasure?
a countermeasure. This does not prescribe how the relative
likelihood and severity of these harms should be taken into
account when developing mitigations, or how they should be
weighted against the benefits provided by the countermeasure.
The framework could potentially be employed alongside ex-
isting risk assessment frameworks, such as ISO27001 or the
NIST risk management guidelines [71].
Our framework acts as a tool which enables users to
consider the following potential outcomes:
(a) Actions introduce whole new classes/types of risk which
no existing countermeasures can manage;
(b) Actions exacerbate existing risks/problems which the
countermeasures were intended to manage;
(c) Actions mask an existing problem.
In this sense, our framework also contributes to the capacity
to have a lasting ‘memory’ of risk management actions - the
framework can be applied repeatedly and recursively across
harm mitigation proposals. In such an iterative deployment
scenario, the framework can help highlight systemic issues
with countermeasure proposals, such as where particular pop-
ulations would frequently be placed at risk if the proposals
were implemented, or certain categories of harm seem to
be repeatedly overlooked by those generating countermeasure
proposals. These systemic issues in the service or environment
can then be addressed by looking at the process which pro-
duces proposals: do external stakeholders need to be included?
Does the scope of proposals need to be extended, e.g., to
countermeasures beyond the immediate control of members
proposing change (such as legal reform, technical standardis-
ation, or public policy)?
Regarding the involvement of external stakeholders, the
deployment of countermeasures related to cybersecurity and
cybercrime often involves multiple agencies and stakeholders
(e.g. [19], [20]). Stakeholders in mitigating cybercrime can
include law enforcement, policymakers, system administrators,
and others [72]. Our framework then defines terms of reference
which can be shared and coordinated across stakeholders.
Unintended harms are not necessarily problematic because
they are harms – a risk assessment may rationally conclude
that the risk of harm generated by a countermeasure is
acceptable given the benefit it will produce. For some coun-
termeasures, the design and implementation may inevitably
lead to some degree of harm. However, where such harms
are unintended, and thus unexpected and unknown, they may
be excluded from a risk assessment activity and not managed
appropriately. This can lead to decisions being taken in an
under-informed manner (referring to the ‘Unknowns’ in Fig-
ure 1, pointing to opportunities to become more informed).
Our framework aims to generate these consequences, not to
paralyze decision-making, but so that consequences can be
more thoroughly anticipated in risk management strategies.
V. VULNERABLE POPULATIONS
A countermeasure may be deployed to manage a risk, with
this realising a benefit for (remaining) users of the managed
service/system. Considering the different unintended harms
described in Section IV, not all users will experience the
benefits of a countermeasure in the same way. We may see
that some discernible user groups are protected by counter-
measures and experience their benefits, while other groups
are left not served by the countermeasure, lacking support,
or at worst harmed directly by the countermeasure. This is
unintended harm if the risk owner does not know that they
have disadvantaged or negatively affected user groups which
they did not knowingly intend to control.
Referring to Table II, unintended harms can include impacts
to User interactions with a Service/System (their observable
behaviours), their access (whether and how they are regarded
as Users in the first instance), and changes to the infrastructure
(such as whether particular Service controls or Shared controls
are present or remain in place). The absence of an assumed
control, user group, or behaviours can also result in harms
(for example, that users on the same platform will respect
each other’s privacy, and that the Service and risk owner will
ensure this).
We are then considering user groups who are ‘collateral
damage’ of a countermeasure — before deployment of the
countermeasure, they would have been assumed to be legiti-
mate users who warrant protection. It would also be assumed
that they would not be adversely affected by the countermea-
sure. This then further motivates the need to preemptively con-
sider how countermeasures may impact distinct users or user
groups — if adverse effects are discovered after deployment
of a control, damage may have already been done.
TABLE II
THE ELEMENTS OF AN OBSERVED SYSTEM AND HOW THEY INTERACT.
Element Description Element Type
Ecosystem A collection of service, user and user group instances ALL
Service Managed service (or system), including assets Actor
User Individual user, who may or may not be in a user group or be using a service Actor
User Group Group of users sharing attached characteristics Actor
User+User Actions Users may interact with each other within or outside a service, individually or within a user group Behaviour
User+Service Actions Behaviour exhibited by a user when interacting with a service (including the data produced as a result) Behaviour
Service control A control that exists only within the domain of a service Infrastructure
Shared control A control which exists within the ecosystem, and may be applied to support a service (un)knowingly Infrastructure
We consider that there can be under-protected user groups
— vulnerable populations — which:
(i) May not have the access or capabilities needed to make
use of provisioned controls, thereby missing the intended
benefit and continuing to live with the risk. They may
need access to more appropriate, alternative controls
(relating to outcome (a), Section IV).
(ii) May be affected by a combination of harms, which may
all affect a user or user group at once. The more distinct
harms which affect a group, the more the group should be
considered as needing concerted assistance. This relates
to outcome (b), Section IV.
(iii) May be ‘forgotten’, especially if they are (inadvertently)
removed from the service (or ecosystem) or their intended
behaviours are restricted. Design accommodations could
then be considered in advance. This relates to the
masking of problems (outcome (c), Section IV), to
the extent where representation/advocacy outside of
technology may be necessary.
Referring to Table II, for (i) above, a user or user group
may remain within a service environment but not be able to
use service-specific or shared controls. An example would
be a presumption that users (and specifically, older adults)
are comfortable and experienced enough with technology to
conduct online banking on a secured website (if the capacity
to conduct banking in-person at a branch has been removed).
An appropriate control for impacted users may be unavailable,
unreachable, or may not yet exist.
For (ii) above, any combination of harms (as in Figure II)
may impact a user or user group. This could, for instance,
be a combination of usability problems in user-facing tech-
nologies, a lack of preparedness and skills support for users,
and the malicious intentions of a determined (i.e., skilled)
attacker/perpetrator with access to the same technologies.
For (iii) above, a user or user group may be taken out of a
service environment and is then reliant on existing (shared)
controls in the wider ecosystem (such as advocacy groups
or basic protections provided in technology), unless specific
support is provided. If user data is created and retained in
the service environment, the absence or lack of user-related
data or user accounts is then of increased relevance. This then
requires a capacity to measure when users, behaviours, groups
or controls cross boundaries between individual services and
the wider ecosystem. An example would be when employees
in a company rely informally on IT support at their workplace,
which they no longer have access to when they retire [73].
A. Vulnerable user groups
Prior work has examined whether security behaviour in-
terventions have a non-uniform effect to reduce harmful
intentions across different groups of (potentially malicious)
users [74]. This is referred to as the ‘differential effects’ of
information security countermeasures. We explore the differ-
ential effects upon users who the infrastructure owners would
not want to be in a state which has the same or more exposure
to risk or a lack of security as it had before deployment of the
countermeasure.
Here we consider a range of vulnerable user groups, which
is not intended to be exhaustive, but instead demonstrates
how some groups in the risk-managed environment may be
disadvantaged by countermeasures more than others. We also
demonstrate here how these groups are disadvantaged while
others may be unaffected or continue to prosper (this being
our definition of a ‘vulnerable population’). We then also
highlight how a ‘vulnerable population’ is ‘hidden’ from view
compared to other groups, and hence more adversely affected.
For these reasons, harms to distinct populations can include
risk dumping upon users who are not prepared or supported; an
unpredictable/destabilised cyber-physical environment which
creates new risks, or; masking of risks from the view of the
risk owner, though the risks persist for the user.
Note also that a population or user group considered ‘vul-
nerable’ in one service domain may not be in another. For
example, a user group inadvertently prohibited from accessing
a specific service may not lack the technical skills to find
another comparable service (to which they may be regarded
as legitimate users like any other). Nonetheless, these users
could have been spared the additional cost if the events
leading to their initial exclusion were preempted and avoided.
Referring to concepts represented across Figure 1 and Table
II, this can be a combination of users and their activities being
inadvertently affected, or the burden on them no longer being
known to the (now former) risk owner.
Vulnerable populations (such as in our Case Studies, Section
III) can include:
• Older adults. May have had fewer opportunities to ha-
bituate use of technologies compared to younger groups
who grew up with computing technologies. Older adults
may however also have a heightened sense of risks. These
users may be ‘hidden’ if they interact with technology
support rarely – for instance, visiting a physical retail
store to buy a new device relatively rarely [73], delegating
device maintenance to a paid ‘IT person’, or rarely
interacting with (positive/enabling) technologies [75].
• Small businesses. Smaller businesses may have fewer
resources available to invest in automated security solu-
tions, and be less likely to have a dedicated security func-
tion to manage threats [76]. For small charities also, this
can include relying on volunteers having the necessary
expertise [77]. Smaller organisations may also delegate
security to an expert IT-security provider company [77].
• Survivors/victims of tech-abuse. May be controlled or
monitored both physically and through (forcibly shared)
devices and online services. Opportunities to configure or
modify devices may be limited, and there are potential
implications if a perpetrator discovers device activity
which they believe interferes with their control [29].
There are frontline services skilled in addressing domestic
and intimate partner abuse, where otherwise those suffer-
ing tech-abuse may be ‘hidden’ from view; the configu-
ration of shared consumer devices is often assumed to be
agreed between all members of a shared living space.
• People with disabilities or impairments. Security and
privacy controls are often developed for the general
population [78]. This can inadvertently sideline not only
groups such as those highlighted above, but also users
with disabilities (such as visual impairments). This high-
lights the need to manage risks while also ensuring
universal access to services, so that all intended users
can benefit.
VI. FRAMEWORK APPLICATION: CYBERBULLYING
Having outlined our framework, we now apply it to a new
case study of cyberbullying:
Jill is a seventh grader. For the past year, Joey and other
classmates have been leaving aggressive comments on Jill’s
Facebook profile. Joey and other classmates also found
out about Jill’s Snapchat account and have been sending
disturbing and threatening images to Jill every day [79].
Various stakeholders have developed and implemented a
range of cyberbullying countermeasures (e.g., [19], [80], [81]).
Countermeasures in this space are not necessarily risk-free,
and merit careful assessment given that one of the target
audience groups is young users [82], [83].
In some instances, the unintended harms of the countermea-
sures outweigh the benefits. For example, parents suggesting
children to include false information such as age with accurate
information in online profiles can interfere with automated
detection and filtering systems [84]. Thinking to the long-
term effects of such strategies, these countermeasures have the
potential to change behaviours and how younger users interact
with technology. They then must be considered carefully.
As it becomes easier to connect with others via the Internet
and social media, there is a rise in prevalence of cyberbullying
and online harassment among teenagers and young adults
[85]–[87]. Cyberbullying victimisation is shown to correlate
with an array of negative consequences. For example, Hinduja
and Patchin [88] found that individuals who were cyberbullied
were more likely to report offline problem behaviours such as
running away from home or carrying a weapon. Females were
also more likely to be victims of cyberbullying [86], [89].
Psychologically, victims of cyberbullying and school-based
bullying were more likely to report suicidal ideation compared
to those who did not experience any type of bullying [90].
To limit these negative outcomes, there are at present a
multitude of countermeasures. To illustrate the applicability
of the proposed framework, we will focus on two common
countermeasures for cyberbullying – education and training
(Section VI-A), and privacy control and management (Section
VI-B). For each countermeasure, we identify potential
unintended harms.
A. Education and training — unintended harms
Education and training programs are frequently recom-
mended to various stakeholders, such as teenagers, parents,
and educators [19], [80], [81], [83]. For teenagers, the goals
of the programs, which tend to be administered school-wide,
are to establish basic knowledge on cyberbullying and appro-
priate online behaviours, and communicate the consequences
of cyberbullying without distinguishing the bullies from the
bullied [83], [91], [92]. One exception is Facebook’s factsheet
where such distinction was taken into consideration [80].
For parents, teachers, and school administrators, the goals
of education and training differ. Rather than establishing basic
knowledge, these programs focus on proper responses to
and prevention of cyberbullying [91], [92]. There are also
programs that place an emphasis on protective factors, such as
a positive school climate [93] and resilience [94], to minimise
the negative impacts of cyberbullying.
Using our framework (Section IV), we outline the
unintended harms of education and training:
• Displacement. There are two possible types of displace-
ment. First, cyberbullies may adapt their behaviours to
circumvent detection. For example, teenagers are advised
to disregard minor teasing and not engage with aggressors
[80], [81]. Such advice can potentially result in cyber-
bullies switching to this strategy compared to more well-
known and problematic cyberbullying behaviours (e.g.,
sending threatening text and messages). Second, there
is the possibility of migration to social media platforms
that are more lax and provide more freedom to users.
For example, in 2013, teenagers started migrating away
from Facebook to other social media platforms such as
Instagram where cyberbullying is more prevalent [87],
[95].
• Insecure norms. Education and training might create
a false sense of security among stakeholders. Despite
a large number of available resources and educational
programs, there is very little empirical evidence on their
effectiveness [83], [92], [96]. For instance, most victims
of cyberbullying do not disclose to adults [86] or utilise
the block function of online communication tools [97].
Although these findings are dated at this point, they
highlight the need to assess if and which education and
training programs are effective.
• Additional costs. There is an extra burden on stake-
holders to develop and implement the countermeasure,
in terms of effort, resources and time. Teachers and
educators need to allocate time to attend training sessions
and/or become trainers for other staff in schools [19],
[98]. For school administrators, the burden lies in coor-
dinating and incorporating these programs into existing
curriculum and community involvement [19], [91]. Rec-
ommended practices often emphasise the role of schools
in initiating education and training programs [19], [81].
In providing knowledge to users of technologies, one
challenge is to ensure that education and training needs
to keep pace with technologies as they emerge, but also
the ways in which technologies are used.
• Misuse. The knowledge and information made available
through education and training, especially school-wide
programs, may potentially be used by perpetrators. En-
gagement in cyberbullying behaviours may correlate with
having been a victim of cyberbullying previously [79],
[86]. Individuals who attend these programs would now
have knowledge on techniques for cyberbullying.
• Misclassification. Incorrect classification arises when
definitions of cyberbullying (which lack consensus [83])
become broad enough or so easily misinterpreted that
ordinary childhood interactions become labelled. Both
mislabelled ‘bullies’ and their ‘victims’ might suffer as
a result of education programs that identify them as part
of a group that needs either censuring or safeguarding.
Misidentified bullies can become scapegoats for the mis-
behaviour of peers, and victims can suffer additional (or
actual) bullying as a result of being labelled [99].
• Amplification. This countermeasure may increase the
occurrence of victim blaming. Currently, victim blaming
is present in pre-teens’ and teenagers’ discourse on cy-
berbullying, where responsibility is placed on victims be-
cause of their actions, or lack thereof [100]. To illustrate,
consider a form of direct bullying where the cyberbully
sends an email with a malicious attachment [79]. The
recipient who opens the email may be blamed, as educa-
tion programs specifically warn individuals not to open
suspicious emails [82]. In this sense, the implementation
of education and training programs can amplify victim
blaming by placing even more responsibility on victims
in recognising cyberbullying behaviours and/or following
prescribed use of technology.
• Disrupting other countermeasures. With a multi-
stakeholder approach on education and training [19],
[81], [83], the likelihood of confusion and contradictory
information is high. The current lack of consensus on
the definition of cyberbullying [83] means that students
may potentially be receiving different advice around
cyberbullying behaviours from their parents, teachers, and
social media platforms.
• Vulnerable population. There are two potential groups
that are at higher risks of experiencing unintended con-
sequences and harm. The first group is the victims of cy-
berbullying. The implementation of educational program
and training may worsen victim blaming among pre-teens
and teenagers [100]. The second group includes pre-teens
and adolescents who experience physical isolation and
rely on online communities for social support. Arguably,
young people ought to be able to have a positive se-
curity experience in using technologies, and be able to
maintain healthy interactions with others without security
precautions becoming overly restrictive. For example,
adolescents diagnosed with cancer may use online forums
to share experiences and cope with emotions [101].
B. Privacy control and management — unintended harms
This category of countermeasure focuses on the availability
and accessibility of personal sensitive information of teenagers
in the cyberspace. This countermeasure tends to target pre-
teens and teenagers where they are advised to reflect before
sharing any information, and learn about privacy settings
and controls for devices, applications, and social media plat-
forms [80], [81].
Beyond pre-teens and teenagers, this countermeasure ap-
plies to parents as well. Parents are advised to be directly
involved in privacy control and management by searching for
their child’s name and making an information removal request
for unwanted materials [92]. Parents have also suggested
to their children to blend false information, such as age,
when sharing personal information in online profiles as a
privacy management technique [84], or rely on applications
that promote online safety via monitoring [102].
Applying the framework, some potential unintended harms
of privacy control and management are as follows:
• Displacement. There are two potential types of displace-
ment. First, the countermeasure may encourage migration
to other types of platforms with more approachable
privacy control settings (pre-teens have reported a lack
of awareness or understanding of privacy settings on sites
such as Facebook [84]). An example is the migration to
Snapchat [103], which advertises straightforward privacy
features such as deletion of content [104]. Second, this
countermeasure may displace harms to individuals with-
out proper privacy settings and controls, or who are less
able to use them.
• Insecure norms Privacy control and management may
foster a sense of complacency among stakeholders. With
applications such as Snapchat, users may be more com-
fortable with sending less safe materials as the content is
deleted once opened [104]. For other applications such
as Facebook, users may be relying on the default privacy
settings to protect them [84].
• Additional costs. Privacy control and management brings
additional costs and effort to pre-teens and teenagers.
They need to dedicate time for learning about privacy
setting controls across devices, applications and plat-
forms [80], [81]. The total costs are greater if an indi-
vidual has multiple accounts and devices, which is quite
common among pre-teens and teenagers. In the United
States, a large proportion of teenagers have more than one
account on social networking sites [105]. This means that
they may either be relying on the default settings, or not
take the time to learn how to increase account privacy.
• Misuse. Privacy control and management can potentially
be used for cyberbullying. First, cyberbullies can create
multiple fake accounts with a mixture of accurate and
false information [79]. This can overwhelm individuals as
they monitor their online presence. Second, cyberbullies
can isolate targeted individuals by requesting the removal
of these individuals’ legitimate information and accounts
that can be found via search engines.
• Misclassification. One scenario where there may be
unintended consequences is parental privacy control and
management [92]. There may be discrepancies between
what parents and teenagers deem as unacceptable and/or
inappropriate information. Such discrepancies may result
in teenagers experiencing breaches of their online privacy.
• Amplification. Privacy control and management may re-
sult in the Streisand effect [33]. When teenagers manage
their online presence by requesting information to be
taken down, it may potentially draw more attention to
it among their peers.
• Disrupting other countermeasures. This countermea-
sure, especially with the practice of mixing accurate and
false information [84], may interfere with countermea-
sures that rely on automated detection and filtering [96],
[106]–[109]. Purposeful inclusion of false information
may result in misclassification and/or biases in these
algorithms and programs.
• Vulnerable population. A vulnerable population that is
more at risk for experiencing unintended consequences
and harms is young users. There is some evidence show-
ing that they engage in safe practices, such as adjusting
privacy settings on social media sites, but at the same
time, there are individuals who seem to be unaware of
such settings [84].
VII. DISCUSSION
Application of the framework can support identification
of appropriate interventions when signs of risks emerge in
a socio-technical system, such as when online relationship
activity begins to include unhealthy behaviours [110].
Looking specifically at service and technology design, it can
be possible to feed the outcomes of applying the framework
into efforts to, for instance, Design Against Crime [111].
The analysis in the cyberbullying scenario identified many
signals and events to either look out for or avoid on social
media or online communication platforms, where crucially this
may be happening against a backdrop of providers wanting
to encourage active and positive use of those services. That
is, the unintended harms can be considered against positive
service attributes which can also be engineered to minimise
potential harms (such as providing advice and support to
young people on social media platforms, which they can
take with them should they deliberately or inadvertently find
themselves online but outside of that platform at any point,
e.g., on an unfamiliar chat-room or forum).
The literature on situational crime prevention [112] and
problem-oriented policing [113] emphasises the need to con-
sider displacement in the selection and assessment of crime
prevention strategies, discussing how to account and measure
for it. This goes to demonstrate the feasibility of a risk
management and assessment framework in designing and
deploying countermeasures — here we approach cyberphysical
crime challenges, but also aim to develop the makings of a tool
which can be used by a range of stakeholders (not just law en-
forcement) toward a coordinated approach to identifying harm-
free interventions in a complex, multi-party service/technology
ecosystem. To that end, the framework may also complement
existing multi-stakeholder capabilities, such as Multi-Agency
Risk Assessment Conferences (MARAC) [114] which are
arranged to manage cases of domestic abuse.
Future work will then investigate the compatibility of our
proposed framework with existing risk assessment and man-
agement literature. For instance, the proposed framework is
compatible with the notion of residual risk, or risks that remain
after appropriate security controls for risk reduction are in
place [115]. With the proposed framework, an assessment of
residual risks will also include examining risks which emerge
because of the deployment of choices in security controls.
Alongside these efforts, a broadening of the security eco-
nomics principles visited in Section II can be developed to
support a structured cost-benefit analysis of risk management
strategies. To consider generally that all countermeasures carry
some kind of adverse side effects, the implementation of
countermeasures should be approached in a manner which is
conscious of these effects and facilitates a reasoned considera-
tion of the side effects with the benefits. Within this is a need
to consider decision-maker preferences, where harms should
not be induced upon user groups who are considered to be
unprepared or unsupported (Section V).
VIII. RELATED WORK
Research into personas in information security [116], [117]
encourages the representation of users by building a narrative
of their perspective on a system. When personas are built
though user engagement, they can identify user previously
unknown user requirements in a cyberphysical system [116],
where our framework directly challenges system owners to
inspect where such requirements may be impacted by risk
controls themselves. Personas used in risk analysis may be
built on the implicit assumptions of system owners [117],
where these assumptions may need to be challenged through
discourse with other stakeholders.
Similarly, use cases and misuse cases can be explored
together to identify security requirements [118]. This process
may be repeated as assets, risks, and controls are identified
within an environment of users and the services they use.
Threat modelling may be used to increase situation
awareness (for instance, with large-scale cyber command
teams [119]), prompting practitioners to consider critical ser-
vice capabilities and related threats. Our framework prompts
stakeholders to consider critical users and user behaviours
alongside capabilities which require protection, to complement
existing efforts to manage risks to capabilities and assets.
Premortems [120] encourage consideration of actions which
can be taken in the present, to avoid existential risks to services
in the future. Our framework, similarly, prompts consideration
of what action could be taken in advance to insulate a process
(for instance, a service or technology) against failure, in this
case weaving unintended harms into the discussion.
From a different perspective, direct studies of stakeholders
can also yield information about risks and unintended con-
sequences; this can include surveys, interviews, and focus
groups. Engagement with cyber security experts [121] has,
for instance, identified expectations for top user behaviours
(highlighting also that even the experts cannot necessarily
agree on how users should be supported and protected).
Interviews with organisational security managers [122] has
identified that they can appreciate the link between security
controls and impacts upon user tasks and priorities; in other
cases, it has also identified that security managers themselves
need tools to be able to consider the impacts that their risk
management strategies have upon users [123].
Most current risk assessment and management approaches
place emphasis on the identification and management of
risks and threats without recognition of the potential harms
such efforts may impose on user behaviours, users and in-
frastructure once countermeasures are deployed. Quantitative
modelling [124] and cost-benefit analysis [71], [125], [126] ap-
proaches primarily consider how to directly address malicious
threats. For example, the AEGIS framework considers coun-
termeasures against the likelihood of attacks and cost-benefit
analysis [126], alluding to side effects of countermeasures as
costs.
The Cynefin framework [127] prompts risk owners to con-
sider the complexities of a managed system and identify appro-
priate responses to cybersecurity risks. The authors emphasise
that where cause and effect are not immediately apparent, there
can be a need to consult with and consider the perspectives of
others within the system. The framework for reducing human-
related risks developed by Islam et al. [128] is motivated in
part by the increased connectedness of individuals and tech-
nologies. The authors also approach cybercrime in terms of
mobilising crime preventers within the system. Our unintended
harms framework complements this goal by prompting risk
owners to consider where the needs of ‘good’ system actors
must be respected in advance of selecting countermeasures.
Many approaches to identifying or managing risks do not
explicitly act to identify unintended consequences, let alone
unintended harms. The proposed framework on unintended
harms aim to equip stakeholders with a systematic approach to
directly relate the consideration and assessment of unintended
impacts — to service/system owners, the service itself, and
service users in a complex ecosystem of increasingly inter-
connected services and user populations — when developing
and deploying cybersecurity countermeasures.
IX. CONCLUSIONS
Here we have identified and charactertised the potential
unintended harms of various cybersecurity risk countermea-
sures. Unintended harms are of increasing importance, firstly,
as they can potentially have far-reaching impacts in current
society where technology and the Internet are highly incor-
porated into our daily lifestyles. A countermeasure deployed
to secure one aspect of interaction with a cyber-physical
system may adversely affect other aspects of that same system.
Countermeasures may prohibit or move behaviours, users, and
elements of infrastructure completely from view or to another
place in the larger ecosystem. We have shown how it is
important to deliberately and proactively explore the potential
for unintended harms.
Second, as illustrated in our case studies, the deployment
of countermeasures related to cybersecurity and cybercrime
often involves multiple agencies and stakeholders. The need
for coordinated efforts from stakeholders adds another layer
of complexity when assessing unintended harms and conse-
quences. This is especially the case if a lack of coordination
and communication between stakeholders can undo the risk
management efforts of others.
There is a need for a strategic approach to uncover cyber-
physical and socio-technical implications of any one cyberse-
curity risk intervention. We have illustrated the capacity of the
framework in considering the unintended harms of candidate
countermeasures, as well as its potential application as part of
broader risk management strategies. Future work will apply the
framework toward limiting unintended harms to society and its
constituent user groups (including vulnerable populations).
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